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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme court had appellate jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah
Code Section 78A-3-102(3) (j), because this appeal is from an order "over which the
Court of Appeals does not ha\e original appellate jurisdiction." Namely, this is an appeal
of the District Court's dismissal of Wasatch County's petition for de novo review of a
formal hearing held before the State Tax Commission. The Tax Commission's decision
is included as Exhibit 1. The District Court's decision is included as Exhibit 2. The
Supreme Court poured this appeal over to this Court pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court now has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Section 78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the District Court properly found that Wasatch County's protective filing
of a cross-petition for review in the Supreme Court deprived the District Court of subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the County's petition for review filed in District Court
pursuant to Utah Code Sections 59-1-601 and 59-1-602?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court has stated, "A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction presents a
question of law, which we review for correctness." Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm 'n,
2005 UT App 4 9 1 4 7, 128 P.3d 31.

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
A.

Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 6(4):
"Notw ithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax Commission in this
Constitution, the Legislature may by statute authorize any court established under
Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any malter decided
by the State Tax Commission relating to revenue and taxation."

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
A.

Utah Code Section 59-1-601 (District court jurisdiction over appeals from Tax
Commission). Attached as Exhibit 3.

B.

Utah Code Section 59-1-602 (Right to appeal - Venue - County as party in
interest). Attached as Exhibit 3.

C.

Rule 1(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
"If a procedure is provided by state statute as to the appeal or review of an order of
an administrative agency, commission, board, or officer of the state which is
inconsistent with one or more of these rules, the statute shall govern, [n other
respects, these rules shall apply to such appeals or reviews."

D.

Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Attached as Exhibit 4.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This appeal is from the final decision of the Third District Court, Judge John Paul
Kennedy presiding, issued August 1, 2008, dismissing Wasatch County's Petition for
Review on jurisdictional grounds. This Order is attached as Exhibit 2.
B. Course of Proceedings
This case originated at the Utah State Tax Commission, where a formal hearing
was held on December 18th and 19th, 2007. The commission issued its written Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision on April 1, 2008. This decision is
attached as Exhibit 1. Wasatch County appealed this decision to the District Court for a
de novo review, pursuant to Utah Code Sections 59-1-601 and 59-1-602, on April 25,
2008.
C. Disposition at Trial Court and Agency
The District Court dismissed the County's request for a de novo review,
concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider it.

RELEVANT FACTS
This case originated in the Utah State Tax Commission. The tax appeals of the
owners of seven parcels of property within Wasatch County were consolidated by the
commission and a formal hearing was held on the consolidated case on December 18th
and 19 ,2007. The commission issued its written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Final Decision on April 1, 2008. Record at 9 to 33; Exhibit 1.
3

First Appeal—Supreme Court
On April 10, 2008, the property owners filed a Petition for Review in the Utah
Supreme Court under case number 20080304. This case was subsequently poured over to
the Court of Appeals and is being briefed simultaneous with the present case. A copy of
the Petition for Review in case number 20080304 was not provided at the time of filing to
Wasatch County. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, by letter, notified Wasatch County
of the property owners' petition, and counsel subsequently provided a courtesy copy of
the same. Thereafter, in order to preserve its rights to affirmatively participate in the
property owners' supreme court appeal, Wasatch County filed a Cross-Petition for
Review with the Utah Supreme Court on April 24, 2008.
Second Appeal—District Court
The next day, on April 25, 2008, Wasatch County filed a Petition for Judicial
Review by trial de novo, with the Fourth District Court, in and for Wasatch County,
pursuant to Utah Code Sections 59-1-601 and 602. Record at 1 to 7. The case was
initially assigned the case number 080500192. Id. On May 5, 2008, the Tax
Commission, through counsel, requested assignment of the case to a tax judge pursuant to
Rule 6-103 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Record at 37. The case was
then transferred to the Third District Court, where it was assigned to Judge John Paul
Kennedy and given the new case number of 080907392.
The owners of one of the parcels of property, Warren and Tricia Osborn ("the
Osborns"), moved to intervene in the district court appeal and also moved to dismiss the
4

district court appeal for failure to join them as parties to the appeal. Record at 2 and 7.
Wasatch County and the Tax Commission agreed that, under the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the Osborns had no need either to intervene or to be "joined" in order to
participate in the County's district court appeal because they were already parties to the
case below. Record at 85-102 and 153-157. The district court agreed and allowed the
Osborns to participate in the case without an intervention or joinder. Record at 204.
At oral arguments on the Osborns' above-mentioned motions, counsel for the
Osborns mentioned for the first time that there was "an issue" as to whether the county
was entitled to exercise its right to district court review because the county had also
elected to simultaneously participate in the Osborns' supreme court appeal arising from
the same Tax Commission decision. Record at 187 (an unofficial transcript of the
hearing prepared by Osborns' counsel). The court asked the parties to brief that issue and
scheduled another hearing to address it. Record at 138.
At the scheduled hearing, the district court, without hearing argument, dismissed
the County's appeal on the basis that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and "referred
[the matter] back to the Appellate Court." Record at 202. In so ruling, the district court
felt that Salt Lake County v. Tax Comm '/*, 596 P.2d 641 (Utah 1979) was dispositive.
Exhibit 2 at 3-4; Record at 205-06. The Osborns' counsel subsequently prepared an
Order for the court and mailed it to counsel on or about July 29, 2008. Record at 207.
Apparently, the Order was simultaneously submitted to the district court, which executed

1

The Record starts over at page 1 after the first 39 pages of it. Therefore, the page numbers 1
through 39 are used twice in the Record. This citation is to the second page numbers 2 and 7.
5

the Order without the benefit of counsel's review on August 1, 2008. The Order, as
prepared by counsel and signed by the court, bases the dismissal on the fact that the
county had cross-petitioned in the Osboms' supreme court appeal and thereby foreclosed
its opportunity to appeal to the district court.
The present appeal constitutes the county's appeal from this Order.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah law accords all parties to a Tax Commission decision the right to choose
whether to seek a record-review by the Utah Supreme Court or a de novo review by a
district court. It does not, however, provide guidance for handling a disagreement among
the parties as to which appellate path to take. Nevertheless, no statute allows one party's
selection of one option to preempt another party's selection of another. Nor does a
statute prohibit a party from both protecting its standing in one appeal filed in the
supreme court by an opposing party and also seeking de novo review in a district court.
Instead, the only requirement under the law is that all petitions for review, in whatever
court, be filed within 30 days of the commission's decision. Wasatch County followed
these rules precisely in initiating its district court review.
The right to obtain district court review is an important one. It was preserved
through the cooperative efforts of the people and their legislators through a constitutional
amendment and the reenactment of judicially invalidated legislation. It discourages a
competitive and secretive race to the courthouse. It promotes the efficient use of judicial
resources by ensuring that factual issues are fully developed, to the satisfaction of the
parties, before the appellate courts conduct their review. And it also allows the appellate
6

courts the benefit of a district court's review of the legal issues involved in a tax
commission decision. For all of these reasons, even if there were any ambiguities in the
statute authorizing district court review, such ambiguities should be construed with an
eye towards preserving the right to district court review, and not eviscerating it.
I
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

ALL PARTIES TO A TAX COMMISSION DECISION ARE GIVEN THE
OPTION OF APPEALING TO THE COURT OF THEIR CHOICE; AND NO
PARTY'S EXERCISE OF THAT OPTION CAN EXTINGUISH ANOTHER'S.
Utah Code Section 59-1-602 (emphasis added) provides as follows:
(1) (a) Any aggrieved party appearing before the commission or county
whose tax revenues are affected by the decision may at that party's
option petition for judicial review in the district court pursuant to this
section, or in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Section 59-1-610.
(b) Judicial review of formal or informal adjudicative proceedings in
the district is in the district court located in the county of residence or
principal place of business of the affected taxpayer or, in the case of a
taxpayer whose taxes are assessed on a statewide basis, to the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County.
(c) Notwithstanding Section 63G-4-402, a petition for review made
to the district court under this section shall conform to the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
(2) A county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision being
7

reviewed shall be allowed to be a party in interest in the proceeding before
the court.
Subsection (l)(a) of this statute authorizes all parties to a Tax Commission
decision to choose the venue of their appeal therefrom—either the district court or the
supreme court. However, while this statute is generous in its delegation of discretion to
the parties to choose the venue for their appeal, it is somewhat parsimonious in its
guidance on how to sort through the conflicts that can arise from the parties' competing
exercise of that discretion. For example, it does not provide instructions on how to
proceed when different parties exercise different options. Neither does it resolve the
issue of priority—i.e., which appeal should proceed first. Nor does it instruct on how to
exercise one's right to appeal to one venue while also protecting one's standing in
another party's appeal in a another venue. All it does is give every party an equal right to
appeal to the court of its choice.
While the statute may not provide guidance on how the courts should
accommodate the exercise of competing appellate options, it certainly does not do what
the appellees want it to do either. Namely, it does not provide a methodology for any
party to extinguish another's right to exercise the appellate option of that party's choice.
Under the present facts, the lower court found that because the county protected its
standing in the appellees' supreme court appeal one day before it exercised its option to
seek district court review, the county somehow forfeited its option to obtain that district
court review. Of course, had the county protected its standing in the appellees' supreme
court appeal one day after it exercised its option to seek district court review, appellees
8

would certainly have argued that the county had somehow mooted, abandoned, or

I
otherwise extinguished its district court review. Perhaps the appellees wrould submit that
the county's only valid method of exercising its option to obtain district court review
without losing its inherent rights to assert appellate issues in the appellees' supreme court
appeal (which could potentially occur without the benefit of intermediate district court
review) would be by filing in both courts at precisely the same moment. Or perhaps they
would argue that it is simply impossible for the county—regardless of the timing of its
filings—to participate in both fora simultaneously: if the county ever desired to assert
appellate issues in the appellees' supreme court appeal then there was simply no way it
could ever initiate its own district court appeal. Fortunately the statute, which is one that
grants all parties equal but competing rights of appeal, does not mandate such an
unforgiving procedure.
Our supreme court has stated, "It is well settled in this court that our goal when
interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the statute's
plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Summit Water
Distribution Co. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, ^ 17, 123 P.3d 437 (internal quotations
omitted). Here, section 59-l-602(l)(a) is a right-granting statute, not a right-restricting
one. It openly grants adverse parties a competing right to appeal to different courts.
Therefore, it clearly contemplates that the exercise of those rights may not always be in
harmony with each other: appeals from the same commission decision may be
simultaneously filed, and heard, in different courts. It would be contrary to the purpose
of this statute to construe it to prohibit parties from participating in their opponents'
9

appeals. In fact, beyond being contrary to the statute's purpose, as will be shown next,
such an interpretation would also unreasonably require parties to forfeit appellate issues.
Once an appeal from an administrative order is filed in any court, all parties below
are automatically parties to the case on appeal, whether they want to be or not.
Viktron/Lika Utah v. Labor Comm Vz, 2001 UT App 8, ^J 3, 18 P.3d 519. And if any of
these unwilling parties fails to file a timely cross-petition in their opponent's appeal, that
opportunity is forever forfeited. Id. at ^ 7; see also Union Pacific Railroad v. State Tax
Comm 7z, 2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17 (untimely petition from Tax Commission deprives
court of jurisdiction); see also URAP 14(a) (requiring petitions for review to be filed
within 30 days of the commission's order and to designate the part of the order to be
reviewed). Thus, while the county would have preferred that the appellees not file their
appeal in the supreme court (now pending in case number 20080304), once the appellees
did so, the county was forced to either raise its appellate issues in that appeal or forever
forfeit them, notwithstanding its preferred option of seeking district court review first.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "[W]e have said that where a statute is
subject to more than one construction, we can interpret it to make sense, and sustain it."
Park and Recreation Comm 'n v. Dept. of Finance, 388 P.2d 233, 234 (Utah 1964). The
lower court interpreted section 59-l-602(l)(a) to prohibit the county's filing in district
court even though the county had not initiated the supreme court appeal. Not only does
this interpretation of the statute ignore its accommodation of competing appeals from the
same commission decision, but it turns that accommodation on its head: instead of
allowing parties to choose for themselves where an appeal will be heard, it allows
10

opposing parties to co-opt that choice by racing to the courthouse." Once any party has
selected a particular court for their appeal, under the lower court's interpretation, all other
parties must either ignore their opponents' appeal—thereby forfeiting their appellate
issues that must be raised only in their opponents' forum—or or they can preserve their
appellate issues that must be raised in their opponents' forum and forever forfeit their
own right to appeal to the court of their choice; they can never do both. Among the
possible interpretations of the statute, this one would make the least sense.
Where 59-l-602(l)(a) generously allows parties to disagree on the optimal
appellate path to take from a commission decision, it would be contrary to this legislative
intent to create a rule that artificially limits that discretion. The full absurdity of such a
rule becomes apparent when one considers that many cases before the commission
involve far more than two parties. In fact, even the present appeal involves seven
property owners, the county, and the commission. Were the seven property owners not
represented by the same law firm, it is conceivable that some of them would have opted
to exercise their right to de novo district court review while others could have chosen to
file directly with the supreme court. In such a circumstance, applying the lower court's
reasoning, the county would have had the Hobson's choice of picking only one of the
competing appeals in which to raise its own appellate issues.

2

In the present case, appellees filed their petition for review (in case number 20080304)
in the supreme court nine days after the commission issued its decision and failed to
notify or otherwise serve the county until a courtesy copy was provided attached to a
letter several days later. This was probably a simple oversight. However, it betrays,
somewhat, the possibility that there was just such a race to the courthouse in the present
case.
11

This is an especially troublesome result where the nature of the appeals are
different—i.e., one being a review of the record and the other being a trial de novo.
Issues that are appropriate in a record review are, of course, different from those that are
appropriate in a de novo review: the former has the potential to change the law of the
case, and the latter has the potential to change the facts. Being forced to raise appellate
issues in only one pending appeal to the exclusion of another can, colloquially speaking,
leave a party winning one battle only to lose the war.
To apply the statute fairly, this Court should do its part to give full meaning and
benefit of the statute to all parties in a way that extinguishes no party's option. Here, the
parties obviously disagree on the most appropriate forum for appeal from the Tax
Commission decision. Appellees prefer to be in this Court; the county prefers to be in the
district court. To fulfill the purpose of the statute by accommodating all parties' options
in the present case, and extinguish none's, this Court should reinstate the county's district
court appeal. Doing so does not detract from the appellees' right to appellate review by
this Court; but it does preserve the county's right to de novo review by the district court.
However, by declining to reinstate the county's district court appeal, this Court would
sacrifice the county's right to obtain district court review merely to preserve the
appellees' right to continue in their current appeal before this Court (in case number
20080304), which right the appellees do not stand to lose anyway.
For the foregoing reasons, if a rule is to be established that nullifies the right to
appeal a Tax Commission decision to district court, then such a rule should be established
in advance and by statute. It should not be created after the fact, by creative statutory
12

interpretation, and in a way that conflicts with the language and intent of the statute that
confers that right.
II.

WASATCH COUNTY PROPERLY INVOKED THE JURISDICTION OF THE
DISTRICT COURT.
As stated above, section 59-l-602(l)(a) gives every party to a commission

decision the right to appeal to the venue of its choice. Section 59-l-602(l)(c) describes
how the choice to seek district court review is expressed. This subsection requires
petitions for review "made to the district court under this section [to] conform to the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure." Rule 14 describes how to initiate such a review. See also
URAP 1(c) ("If a procedure is provided by state statute as to the appeal or review of an
order of an administrative agency, commission, board, or officer of the state which is
inconsistent with one or more of these rules, the statute shall govern. In other respects,
these rules shall apply to such appeals or reviews."). It requires a "petition for review
[to] be filed with the clerk of the appellate court," in this case the district court, "within
the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time prescribed, then within 30 days after
the date of the written decision or order." URAP 14(a). The petition "shall designate . . .
the order or decision, or part thereof to be reviewed." Id. Additional requirements are
that the petition name the commission as the respondent, and that the petition be served
upon the commission, "upon all other parties to the proceeding before the agency, and
upon the Attorney General of Utah." URAP 14(a) and (c).
Wasatch County faithfully followed the requirements of section 59-l-602(l)(c)
and Rule 14 to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. Upon receiving a decision
13

from the commission, the county, in reliance upon Utah law, exercised its right to petition
the district court for review by following the plain language of the relevant statute and
rule. No other requirements exist to invoke district court jurisdiction. Importantly, there
is not even a requirement that no previous, protective cross-appeal have been filed in the
supreme court. Therefore, where the county has complied with all of the procedures
required to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court, the district court enjoyed, and
should have exercised, its jurisdiction over the county's petition.
By properly following the procedures outlined in Rule 14 to invoke the district
court's jurisdiction, the county has clearly and unequivocally expressed its "option" to
have the district court conduct a de novo review. Indeed, there exists no confusion about
the county's expression: it is not ambivalent, vague, or unclear. Instead, in order to
dismiss the county's petition, the district court was required to deny the County's request
despite its clarity, not because the court was confused about it.
III.

THE RIGHT TO A DE NOVO DISTRICT COURT REVIEW IS IMPORTANT,
AND THE LEGISLATURE AND THE PEOPLE OF UTAH INTENDED TO
PRESERVE ITS VIABILITY.
Our supreme court has observed, "This court's primary responsibility in

construing legislative enactments is to give effect to the legislature's underlying intent."
Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm ft, 811 P.2d 664, 671 (Utah 1991). "In
determining the legislative intent of a statute, the statute should be considered in the light
of the purpose it was designed to serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if it can
be done consistent with its language." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
The people of Utah and their legislature have found the importance of a de novo
14

district court review sufficiently important that they preserved it through a constitutional
amendment. In 1997, the Utah Supreme Court held Utah Code Section 59-1-601
I

unconstitutional because it authorized district courts to conduct a de novo review of Tax
Commission decisions in violation of the Utah Constitution as it then existed. Evans &
Sutherland v. Tax Commission, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997). Responding to Evans &
Sutherland, the people of Utah amended the Utah Constitution in 1998 to authorize de
novo review in district court. That authorization has survived subsequent amendments to
the Utah Constitution and is currently found in Article XIII, Section 6(4). The Utah
legislature simultaneously (in 1998) re-adopted section 59-1-601. The Court can
conclude, from this history, that the people of Utah and their legislature consider the right
to de novo district court review to be an important one, and that they intended to preserve
that right through constitutional amendment and legislative processes.
Ironically, the case found and cited by the district court in dismissing the county's
de novo review also supports the historical importance of the de novo district court
review. In Salt Lake County v. Tax Commission, 596 P.2d 641 (Utah 1979), Salt Lake
County appealed a commission decision directly to the Utah Supreme Court. The law at
the time allowed parties "aggrieved by a decision of the commission . . . to choose to
waive the right of review by the tax division of the district court and apply for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court in which event such party must state in the application for
the writ that the party is waiving the right of review and trial de novo in the tax division
of the district court." 596 P.2d 644-45 (concurrence of Croft, District Judge). The court
noted that the county had failed, in its pleadings before the supreme court, to expressly
15

waive its right to de novo district court review. 596 P.2d at 644. Nevertheless, the court
treated that failure as a "pleading deficiency of the kind to which the pleader's adversary
must make timely objection or the right to object is waived." Id.
Far from supporting the dismissal of the County's district court review, Salt Lake
County shows that, historically, the de novo district court review was, if anything,
legislatively preferred over a direct supreme court review. This same legislative
preference for the availability of a de novo review pervades the current statutory
framework, which, as shown above, was preserved by constitutional amendment.
Consequently, narrowly construing the statute, which intends to preserve this option, in a
manner that effectively eviscerates the option would appear to be inappropriate.
Perhaps one reason that a de novo district court review has been so important in
Utah is because it preserves a constitutional check and balance on tax policy. While
commissioners have the background to hear tax cases and interpret tax laws, they also
supervise and administer Utah's tax system and report to the legislature as to legislative
issues. U.C.A. § 59-1-210(22). These dual roles can create an inherent conflict of
interest. A de novo review provides an impartial check and balance by the judicial
branch on the legislative branch of government in Utah. Nullifying the effectiveness of
appeals from a commission decision to district court would eliminate this important
check.
Current statutory procedures, adopted pursuant to constitutional amendment, allow
both the supreme court (or this Court) and the district court to exercise simultaneous
jurisdiction over separate appeals from the same commission decision. This is not only
16

what the literal words of the statute say, but it is also what they intend to say. Failing to
reinstate the county's district court petition would vitiate the county's constitutionally
preserved and legislatively bestowed option to obtain this district court review.
IV.

ALLOWING THE COUNTY TO ENJOY ITS DISTRICT COURT REVIEW IS
AN EFFICIENT USE OF JUDICIAL RESOURCES.
If possible, statutes should be construed in a manner consistent with good public

policy. Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C v. State, 2001 UT App 210, U 17, 29 P.3d
650 ("we look with an eye toward the construction that will achieve the best results in
practical application, will avoid unacceptable consequences, and will be consistent with
sound public policy"); Summit Water Distribution Co. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, f
29, 123 P.3d 437 ("antitrust laws must be interpreted in light of the strong public policy
disfavoring anticompetitive practices"). Public policy favors an efficient use of judicial
resources. Mann v. Fredrickson, 2006 UT App 475, ^ 7 , 153 P.3d 768 (the practice of
automatically transferring cases among judges whenever there are judicial reassignments
is observed to be an inefficient use of limited judicial resources); Buckner v. Kennard,
2004 UT 78, T| 17, 99 P.3d 842 (recognizing the "strong public policy favoring arbitration
as an approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court
congestion"). Allowing the county to avail itself of district court review creates
efficiencies and benefits that public policy supports.
Section 59-1-601 states,
(1) In addition to the jurisdictipn granted in Section 63G-4-402,
beginning July 1, 1994, the district court shall have jurisdiction to review
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by trial de novo all decisions issued by the commission after that date
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) As used in this section, "trial de novo" means an original,
independent proceeding, and does not mean a trial de novo on the record.
(3) (a) In any appeal to the district court pursuant to this section taken
after January 1, 1997, the commission shall certify a record of its
proceedings to the district court.
(b) This Subsection (3) supersedes Section 63G-4-403 pertaining to
judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings.
This statute grants district courts the jurisdiction to review, by trial de novo, all
Tax Commission decisions. Nevertheless, even though it is a de novo review, subsection
(3) requires the commission to certify a record of its proceedings to the district court.
This allows the parties, and the district court, to rely on the record to the extent desired
and yet to also supplement the record by as much ofade novo presentation of evidence
as wished. Thus, trials de novo in district court may be, if desired by the parties, fairly
refined reviews, focusing only on the narrow issues that, in one or another party's view,
were unsatisfactorily resolved by the commission. This is an efficient and effective way
to fully distill factual and legal issues before they are decided, on a statewide application,
by the appellate courts. This brief will first address the benefits of distilling the factual
issues. Then it will briefly address the benefits of a district court review of legal issues.
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A. This Court Will Benefit From a Full Distillation of the Facts at Issue.
The central issue on appeal in this case is the correct valuation methodology to
apply when taxing a homesite under the Farmland Assessment Act, found in Utah Code
Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 5 (the "FAA"). "The choice of valuation methodology in
assessing property is a question of fact[, and t]he resulting determination of fair market
value is also a question of fact." Salt Lake City S.R.R. Co. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 1999
UT 90, Tj 13, 987 P.2d 594, 598. On direct appeal to an appellate court, the commission's
findings of fact are reviewed under a "substantial evidence" standard. § 59-l-610(l)(a).
This standard defers to the facts previously found by the commission, whereas a trial de
novo—"an original, independent proceeding, and [not] a trial de novo on the record"—
allows a district court to re-examine those facts afresh. § 59-1-601(2) (emphasis added).
By affording parties to a Tax Commission formal proceeding the right to independent
judicial review of that proceeding, and the concomitant right to adduce additional
evidence before the issues are reviewed by the appellate courts, Utah law gives our courts
the optimal ability to fully hear and consider the relevant facts before issues are decided
on the appellate level, where the decision will have statewide effect. In the present case,
these facts are complex, vastly at variance, and particularly susceptible to district court
review.
This case involves the application of the Farmland Assessment Act to a prestigious
recreational subdivision in Wasatch County. The central factual issue at trial related to
the value of the one-acre homesites that were removed from the FAA by the construction
of a primary residence thereon. The evidence at the formal hearing showed that each
19

homesite must be located within a ten-acre building envelope designated by the property
owner, with some oversight by the homeowners' association. The county submitted
evidence that 65% of the value of the entire lot is attributable to the one-acre homesite.
The property owners argued that the value of each homesite was equal to approximately
0.6% of the value of the entire lot—a difference of two orders of magnitude from the
county's valuation.
The commission arrived at a sort of compromise position by concluding that 65%
of the value of the entire lot is attributable to the ten-acre building envelope in which the
homesites must be located, and not just the one-acre homesites themselves. It then
concluded that it had insufficient information to further allocate value within those ten
acres. Specifically, the commission stated, "As far as allocating a portion of the 65% to
the one acre [homesite], the Commission is unable to further determine which portion of
the value is attributable to each acre, other than using 1/10 of the 65% of the total market
value." Exhibit 1, at 12, ^J 30. Therefore, concluding that it lacked evidence to allocate
value within each ten-acre building envelope, the commission simply divided 65% by 10
to arrive at the value of any given acre within that envelope, including the homesite.
Thus, the commission concluded that the value of each one-acre homesite was 6.5% of
the value of the entire lot—one order of magnitude less than suggested by the county and
one order of magnitude greater than suggested by the property owners.
To the extent that the commission lacked sufficient evidence to accurately allocate
value to the one-acre homesites within the ten-acre building envelopes, Wasatch County
has the right to provide that evidence through a de novo review in district court. Where
20

such an enormous difference exists between the parties' evidence—two orders of
magnitude—and where the commission itself felt that its valuation methodology was
based on an incomplete understanding of the circumstances, leading it to precisely
compromise the party's positions, it is consistent with public policy to conserve judicial
resources by allowing the parties to develop the record as completely as possible before
this Court settles the question for statewide application. Otherwise, if this Court's ruling
in the companion case (number 20080304) is perceived to be based on incomplete facts,
it is unfortunately very likely that the parties will be asking this Court to re-examine the
issue again after the next tax year is litigated.3
By authorizing de novo district court review in Article XIII, Section 6, of the Utah
Constitution, and by affirmatively creating that right in Utah Code Section 59-1-601, the
people of Utah and their legislature have granted two opportunities to build a record to
ensure an effective and efficient appeal to the supreme court (or this Court). This Court
should not ignore this intent by foreclosing the second opportunity.
B. This Court Will Benefit From an Intermediate Review of the Legal Issues in
Dispute.
The legal issues involved in this case also merit examination by the district court
before this Court resolves them on a state-wide basis. An important issue in the valuation
of the one-acre homesites involved in this appeal is the appropriate application of the
relevant statutes in valuing the one-acre homesites under the FAA.

3

Tax appeals for the year 2007 from the same subdivision, filed by the same attorneys,
are already pending but stayed at the Tax Commission, awaiting this Court's resolution of
the issues in this case and the companion case (number 20080304).
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The appellees have argued in their appeal (case number 20080304) that the only
legally valid application of the pertinent statutes requires valuing the one-acre homesites
by dividing the total lot value by the number of acres in the lot. This is supported by
Utah Code Section 59-2-102(12), which defines "fair market value" as "the amount at
which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller." Thus,
the argument goes, since the one-acre homesites cannot be sold separately from the 160acre lots of which they form an indivisible part, they have no fair market value at all.
Wasatch County argued, and still argues, that applicable statutes do not require
every acre in the large lots to be valued equally, and that the acre on which the property
owners' homes sit can be recognized as the most valuable of them all. This argument is
supported by Utah Code Section 59-2-507(2), of the Farmland Assessment Act, which
requires "the farmhouse and the land on which the farmhouse is located" to be "valued,
assessed, and taxed using the same standards, methods, and procedures that apply to
other taxable structures and other land in the county." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the
argument goes, the county's assessor is required to compare the one-acre homesites to
similar one-acre homesites and derive a value from that hypothetical comparable.
The commission, of course, adopted a compromise position not only factually, as
shown in section IV of this brief, but legally as well. It held that the majority of the value
of the lot is neither spread equally throughout the lot—as argued by the appellees—nor
concentrated as entirely within the one-acre homesite as argued by the county. Instead, it
concluded that the value could be accurately allocated to the ten-acre building envelope
but could not be accurately allocated within that envelope, at least with the evidence they
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possessed at the time. This Court can only benefit from a district court's examination of
this novel issue for which no case precedent currently exists.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Wasatch County asks this Court to reverse the district
court's dismissal of the county's de novo review and to reinstate that review.
DATED this

/

day of November, 2008.

THOMAS L. LOW
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONERS/
APPELLANTS, WASATCH COUNTY
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EXHIBIT 1

I

BKSvfB—I
APR C 2 2006

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

WARREN AND TRICIA OSBORN, MICHAEL F.
SULLI\' AN, DAVID AND CYNTHIA MIRSKY, |
NORMAN PROVAN, JEFFREY AND NANCY
TRUMPER, GARY AND CATHERINE
CRITTENDEN, DAVID CHECKETTS AND
MOUNT CLYDE ENTERPRISES L C,

FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND FLNAL DECISION
Appeal Nos. 06-1504, 06-1505, 06-1506, 061507, 06-1508. 06-1509, 06-1510
Tax Type- Property Tax.'Locally Assessed
Tax Year: 2006 & Roll Back Period 2001-05

Petitioner,
vs.

Judge:

Phan

BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF WASATCH
COUNTY, UTAH,
Respondent.

This Order may contain confidential "commercial information" within the meaning of Utah Code Sec. 59-1-404,
and is subject to disclosure restrictions as set out in that section and Utah Admin. Rule R861-1A-37. The rule
prohibits the parties from disclosing commercial information obtained from the opposing party to nonparties,
outside of the hearing process. However, pursuant to Utah Admin. Rule R861-1A-37 the Tax Commission may
publish this decision, in its entirety, unless the property taxpayer responds in writing to the Commission, within
30 days of this order, specifying the commercial information that the taxpayer wants protected.
Presiding:
Pam Hendrickson, Commission Chair
Marc Johnson, Commissioner
Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge
Appearances:
For Petitioner:

Max Miller, Attorney at Law
Randy Grimshaw. Attorney at Law
Norman Provan, Owner
Douglas Anderson, Developer
For Respondent: Thomas Low, Wasatch County Attorney
Glen Burgener, Wasatch County Assessor
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on December

18-19, 2007
-

makes its

Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby

Appeal Nos 06-1504, 06-1505, 06-1506, 06-1507, 06-1508, 06-1509 & 06-1510

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioners are appealing the assessed values as set b\ the Wasatch County Board of

Equalization for the land on the subject lots, for the 2006 tax year. In addition to the 2006 assessed value,
Petitioners Sullivan, Mirsky, Crittenden, Provan and Trumper are appealing the rollback tax assessment against
each of their properties subject to this appeal.
2.

As of the lien date at issue the properties had residences or buildings either constructed or in

partial states of construction. The value of the buildings was not at issue in this appeal.
3.

The subject properties are all located in the Wolf Creek Subdivision in Wasatch County. The

owner, parcel number, size and valuations as assessed by Respondent, which are the subject of this appeal, are
as follows:
Petitioners

Lot/Parcel No.

Acres

County's Rollback County Board's 2006
Values Appealed
Values Appealed

Warren & Tricia Osborn

61/OWR-4B61

160

No Rollback
Appeal

Land-GreenBelt $ 201,800
Land-Homesite $ 550,000

Michael Sullivan

46/OWR-3A46

184

2001-2005
$360,000 per year

Land-Greenbelt $1,040,288
Land-Homesite $ 360,000

David & Cynthia Mirsky

53/OWR-4A53

160

2002-2006
$698,200 per year

Land-Greenbelt $1,150,000

Gary & Catherine
Crittenden

75/OWR-5B75

160

2001-2005
$360,000 per year

Land-Greenbelt $ 562.100
Land-Homesite $ 1,080.000

Norman Provan

25/OWR-2A25

160

2001-2005
$773,200 per year

Land-Greenbelt $ 476.800
Land-Homesite $ 773,200

Jeffrey & Nanc> Trumper

50/OWrR-3A50

160

2001-2005
$360,000 per year

Land-Greenbelt $1,040,000
Land-Homesite $ 360,000
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David Checketts & Mount
Clvde Enterprises LC

4

12 OUR-2012

160

No Rollback
Appeal

Land-Greenbelt $ 201 800
Land-Homesite $ 845 000

The Wolf Creek Ranch subdivision ( Ranch") is an exclusive approved and platted

subdivision

It covers approximate!} 14,000 acres and has 84 single-family home site parcels With the

exception of a few parcels all home site parcels in the subdiv ision are at least 160 acres All parcels subject to
this appeal are 160 acres or larger Access to the subdivision is from a main gate at 3480 Bench Creek Road in
\\ oodland and a secondary gate located off of Lake Creek Road in Heber City Access to the subject lots is
pro\ ided year round by paved interior roadways, which are maintained by the subdivision
5

The land uses surrounding the Ranch are primarily recreational and agricultural in nature The

Ranch shares approximately seven miles of common boarder with the Uinta National Forest on the east, which
is accessible from the Ranch Jordanelle Reservoir is ten miles west and Rockport State Park and Reservoir 20
miles north Park City with its ski and summer resorts is located approximately 22 miles northwest
6

The subdivision amenities at the Ranch include a 26-acre common area with an equestrian

center and stables, a 2 800 square foot guesthouse and two large trout stocked ponds There is another 23-acre
common area with tepees, fire pits, campground areas, corrals and approximately one-mile of frontage along
the Upper Provo River There are several yurts at the property that can be accessed by the residents There is
approximately fifty miles of equestrian trails through the ranch and the entire property is protected by private
security
7

Although each subject parcel is 160 acres or larger, it can be developed as only one single-

family home site
8.

The limitations on development are both from zoning and a conservation easement The

property is zoned P-160 under the jurisdiction of Wasatch Countv

- i _

P-160 ib a preservation zoning where
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development may be limited do to remoteness of services, topography and other sensiti\e environmental issues.
Residential development is allowed in the zoning with basically one residence per 160 acres. Conditional uses
include groupings of residential lots provided that density is not increased, water storage, fishing acti\ ities and
sand and gravel quarrying.
9.

The principal developer of the Ranch, Douglas Anderson, testified that the area had been

ranched for over ont hundred years and it was the uitent in developing the Ranch to preserve large amounts of
open space and continue the ranching tradition. As there was the possibly that zoning could be changed and
higher density allowed at some point in the future by the County or other governmental jurisdiction, to insure
the restrictions remained permanently, they placed conservation easements on the property as it was
subdivided. The conservation easements were granted to the Utah Open Lands Conservation Association, Inc.
As such the subject lots are permanently encumbered by the conservation easements. The conservation
easements allow for one-home site with the improvements specifically limited to the 10-acre building envelope.
Within the 10-acre building envelope the property owner may construct both a primary single-family residence
and a caretaker residence. A garage and other barns and outbuildings may be constructed. All the buildings
must be located within the ten-acre envelope as well as any roadways, utility lines; water wells water storage
tanks, waterlines and septic tanks. The 10-acre building area may not be located in wildlife birthing areas,
goshawk nesting habitats or riparian areas. The conservation easement would permanently prohibit buildings
or other improvements on the acres outside of the 10-acre building envelope. Further, there could be no
quarrying or mining on the property.
10.

Subject to some restrictions, that included specified habits and riparian areas or the County

building requirements regarding slope and setbacks, the purchaser chooses which ten contiguous acres to use
for the building envelope, and then chooses the home site within those acres. Norman Provan, an owner of one
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of the subject lots, and Mr. Anderson both testified that not only could the homeowners choose the site of the
building envelope it was possible to move the building envelope at least until construction commenced, and
even then there was some possibility of adjustment as long as it encompassed the buildings. Mr. Andersen
testified that typically the location of the building envelope was limited only by Count}' building restrictions.
During the period now subject to the rollback, the 10-acre building envelopes had not yet been designated.
Based on these factors the Commission finds that during the rollback period there was no specific one-acre of
the property designated as the home site or ten acres designated as the building envelope.
11.

Mr. Provan, an owner of one of the subject lots testified that he purchased the lot because of

size and restrictions on development. He indicated he chose the property over other subdivisions because he
liked that all 14,000 acres would be preserved with the same restrictions and remain as a wilderness setting.
He also felt he was doing something good by preserving open space. Another owner, Mike Sullivan testified
that they purchased the property because they wanted the large acreage and a place to ride their horses. It was
his understanding that the restrictions on the property made it so that each lot could not be subdivided.
12.

As the property had been ranched for many years it had been assessed under the Farmland

Assessment Act (UF AA") for property tax purposes, based on its agricultural use, rather than its market value.
Agricultural use continues over most of the Ranch property as of the date of the hearing as the Homeowners
Association leases the Ranch property out to a sheep operation. A property owner may fence their 10-acre
building envelope to keep the sheep out of that portion of the property, but must allow sheep to graze on the
remaining acreage. As of the lien date, none of the Petitioners had chosen to fence their 10-acre building
envelopes and have allowed the sheep to graze throughout their properties. The Count} had assessed these
properties with the entire parcel valued as greenbelt property under the FAA even after the subdivision was
platted, up until the time a building permit v\as issued. Once a building permit was taken out on a particular
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parcel the County removed the one-acre home site from valuation under the FAA and that one-acre became
subject to the roll back tax. However, the County considered the other 159-acres or more on each parcel to
remain as greenbelt and the County continues to assess the remaining acres under the FAA.
13.

The FAA requires disparate treatment regarding the home site and remaining acres that are

ranched or farmed. Pursuant to the FAA. the farmhouse and land used in connection with the farmhouse is not
taxed under the act, but is instead assessed based on fair market value. For greenbelt properties located outside
of city limits, Wasatch County applies a standard of one as the land used in connection with the farmhouse, or
home site.
14.

As there had been sales of lots in the Ranch, there was market information to determine a fair

market value for each parcel at issue. The reason the matter came before the Commission for the Formal
Hearing was that the parties were in disagreement on how much of the total value of the 160-acre parcels
should be attributed to the one-acre home sites. A determination of the value for the one-acre is relevant for
the purposes of determining the amount of the rollback, as well as for the assessment for the 2006-year.
15.

W7hen the County issued the Tax Notices for the years that are now subject to the rollback, the

notices did not list out or allocate a portion of the total market value to either the home site acre or the building
envelope. Instead, the notices listed a single, total market value for the entire parcels. Because the property
was taxed as greenbelt under the FAA, the amount of the tax assessed, however, was not based on the market
value, but instead on the greenbelt value pursuant to the FAA.
16.

Petitioners submitted an appraisal for each of the properties at issue, which had been prepared

by Philip Cook, MAI, and CRE. Mr. Cook's appraisal was limited to a market valuation of the land only. It
was Mr. Cook's appraisal conclusion that there was some variation in values between the lots, due to factors
like view, slope and forestation. It was his appraisal conclusion that the total market value of the land for each
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of the parcels at issue, as of January 1. 2006, was as follows:
Lot 12
Lot 25
Lot 46
Lot 50
Lot 53
Lot 61

$1,350,000
51,340,000
$1,410,000
$1,715,000
$1,285,000
$1,715,000

Lot 75 $1,850,000
17.

Mr. Cook's market values for each subject parcel were not substantially disputed by

Respondent Mr Cook's market value conclusions for the land were based on eleven lot sales, all located
within the Ranch. The sales had occurred from October 2004 through May 2006. The lots had sold for prices
ranging from $1,225,000 to $1,800,000.
18.

In his appraisal Mr Cook also gave his opinion of how the total value should be allocated to

the various components of the lot, including the one-acre home site. It was his position that allocations to the
functional areas of each lot must reflect the market value and he indicated there were circumstances when a
separate value for a home site consisting as part of a larger parcel could be determined. However, it was his
conclusion that in this matter, any allocation of the total purchase price of the lot to the home site was simply
not market supported. He reached this conclusion because the 160 acres could not be subdivided and with the
restrictions from zoning and conservation easements the highest and best use of the subject lots were as large
160-acre single family lots He pointed to the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and
indicates that they specifically warn against allocating value without market support.1 It was his opinion that
the County had apportioned the values to the various components of the lots arbitrarily It was Mr. Cook's
conclusion that if it is necessary to allocate or apportion part of the total lot value to the home site acre, it could
onlv be done pro rata, 1 160th of the total value, as it is the entire lot and the similarity to all other lots within
I Mr Cook cites to Lniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and Advisorv Opinions 2006 Edition, Appraisal
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the development that create the value.
19.

David A. Thomas. Professor of Law, testified that the zoning and conservation easement had

to be taken into account in determining the value. It was his opinion that it was not legal to buy or sell any
portion of the lot smaller than the total 160 acres. This was a point that was supported by all evidence and not
disputed. It was Professor Thomas' conclusion that because one acre could not be sold separately, there was
no fair market value for the one-acre home site, only a value for the property as a whole. Professor Thomas
also pointed out that additional value will be taxed in the improvements.
20.

Robert Crawford, PhD, testified that the conservation easement actually enhanced the value of

the property. He also testified that the highest and best use of the property was not for agriculture, it was
instead as a 160-acre residential building lot. As part of the whole he concluded that each acre of the 160-acre
property had the same value as all the other acres. He stated that a fair market value for the one-acre home site
could be determined but only on the basis of 1/160 of the total value as indicated by Mr. Cook. It was Dr.
Crawford's conclusion that recognizing an allocated valuation method to all the acres is economically valid as
it the way of expressing the enhanced value of the whole. The right to build a residence somewhere on the
property presumably increase the value of the 160 acre lot. That will be reflected in the price per acre. He did
not find an extracted market value using lots similar in size that have sold to be a valid valuation technique.
21.

Glen Burgener, the Wasatch County Assessor, testified that under the FAA, the County is

required to allocate a portion of the total value to the home site acre, which is subject to tax on a fair market
value basis, while the remainder of the property was taxable under greenbelt. He testified that he had been
applying the FAA to properties for seventeen years in Wastatch County. The County had farms with home
sites on numerous properties of varying zones where the County is required to allocate a portion of the total

Standards Board. The \ppratsal Foundation, Standards Rule I-4(e) Comment
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value to the home site. In addition to farms in the P-160 zone, there were farms with home sites on properties
in the following zones: A-20 allowing onl> 1 residence per 20 acres ; R-A-5 allowing onl> one residence per 5
acres; R-A-1 allowing onl> one residence per 1 -acre. To establish a value for the home site, the County would
consider values of buildable lots in the area. It was the County's position that the right to build a residence is
part of the home site valufe.
22.

In 1999, when the subject lots were platted and because of the conservation easement, Mr.

Burgener sought advise from representatives of the State Tax Commission's Property Tax Division on how to
allocate the total values of the property. At this time, the County made the determination that the total value,
which was based on the sales, would be allocated 60% to the primary residential buildable site, 22% to the
secondary or caretaker's buildable site, $25,000 per acre to the rest of the acres in the building envelope and
whatever was left of the market value to the remaining acres. It was the County's position that a substantial
portion of the value of the remaining 150-acres shifted to the 10 acres building envelope due to the
conservation easement. However, this valuation break out was not conveyed to the property owners on the
annual Tax Notices issued for the years that are now subject to the rollback.
23.

Blaine D. Hales, Certified General Appraiser, prepared an appraisal for the Respondent for

purposes of estimating the value of the one-acre home site on the property. The appraisal was prepared for one
lot, Lot 75, which was the Crittenden property. It was the County's intent that the same methodolog} for
determining the value for the home site be applied to the other properties It was Mr Hales conclusion that the
total value of Lot 75 was 51,800,000, of which $1,200,000 was for the one-acre home site and $600,000 for
the reaming 159 acres.
24.

In his appraisal, Mr. Hales determined the value of the one-acre site by estimating the overall

value of the entire parcel and using additional data to allocate or estimate the v alue contributed bv the one-acre
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home site to the overall parcel It was his conclusion that he could determine a fair allocation of the market
value, despite that the one acre could not be legally sold separately.
25

Like Mr. Cook. Mr. Hales' estimate of the total market value came from sales within the

Ranch, all located very near Lot 75. He also considered the purchase price of Lot 75, which was $1,800,000
on October 29, 2004. It was his conclusion that the fair market value of the land only on Lot 75, as of the
January 1, 2006 lien date, was $1,800,000. As a comparison, Mr. Cook had valued this lot at $1,850,000.
26.

To determine a value for the one acre home site, it was Mr. Hales position that the building

site, when reduced to one acre, must also include the legal right to construct a home because the appraiser must
be careful to divide both the physical and legal components of the property. He attributed the right to build to
the one acre while the remaining 159 acres he considered to have only the limited agricultural and recreational
uses.
27.

To estimate the allocation to the one acre, Mr Hales relied on two methods: 1) determining the

value of the unbuildable portion of the property; and 2) determining the value of the right to build by
considering sales of conservation easements. To determine the value of the unbuildable land, Mr. Hales found
six comparables of rangeland with recreational desirability, but without the right for potential residential
development. He concluded that these sales indicated a value for the unbuildable portion of the property to be
$500,000. In this analysis, Mr. Hales indicated that he considered 159 acres as unbuildable and only the oneacre, used by the County as the home site, as buildable. From the analysis of conservation easements he relied
on six sales and concluded that the right to build on the subject along with the one-acre home site would
represent approximately 65% of the subject's value while the remainder should be allocated to the unbuildable
agricultural and recreational land. In his reconciliation of the two approaches he concluded that 65% of the
total value should be allocated to the buildable home site and the remainder to the agricultural land
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28.

Upon review of ail the evidence in this matter, the Commission concludes that prior to

designation of the 10-acre building envelope, as evidenced by the issuance of a building permit, there would be
no distinction in value from one acre to the next for the 160 acre parcels, as the right to build was attached to
the value of the entire lot as a whole and each acre up to the 160 acres contributed equally to the value.
29.

Hov\ever, once the 10-acre building envelope has been designated, the value is no longer

equally contributed on a per acre basis. All development and improvement must be limited to the ten acres.
The right to build attaches to the building envelope. Furthermore, the restrictions of the conservation easement
are then attached to the now identifiable 150 acres. The owner may no longer build fences, roadwavs, corrals,
swimming pools, manmade ponds or gardens on the 150 acres. Once the building envelope has been
established there is a clearly identifiable difference between the 10-acre building envelope and the remainder of
the property, a difference that does impact how these two portions of property contribute to the value.
30.

Regardless of the fact that a one-acre home site may not legally be sold separately from the

159 acres of the lot, the County must allocate a fair market value to the one-acre based on the express language
of the F AA. Mr. Hales was the only party who attempted to do this in a manner that reflects the reality that the
building site is worth more than the undevelopable property subject to the conservation easement. Absent
evidence from Petitioner's experts that addressed the disparity in value, the Commission accepts Mr. Hales
conclusion that 65% of the value of the total lot is attributable to the developable portion of the land.
However, the Commission finds that the building site is not one-acre, it is ten-acres. From a review of Mr.
Hales* appraisal, his testimony at the hearing regarding the 10-acre building site and that of the other witnesses
describing the potential for the 10-acre envelope, the Commission concludes that the 65% for the buildable
portion applies to the 10 buildable acres and is not appropriately limited to a one-acre home site. Nine of the
ten buildable acres as of the lien date were still being used for agricultural purposes and one acre must be

-11-

Appeal Nos. 06-1504. 06-1505, 06-1506, 06-1507, 06-1508. 06-1509 & 06-1510

valued as the home site according to statute As far as allocating a portion of the 65° o to the one-acre, the
Commission is unable to further determine which portion of the value is attributable to each acre, other than
using 1/10 of the 65% of the total market value.
31.

Mr. Cook has appraised each individual lot at issue in this appeal to determine a total value as

of the January 1, 2006 lien date. The County's assessments for 2006 were not always consistent with Mr
Cook's conclusions. The Countv did not substantially refute Mr. Cook's total values for each lot, and the
County did not submit an appraisal of each lot. For tax year 2006, the Commission accepts Mr. Cook's total
lot value for the land portion of each of the subject properties. The Commission finds the value of the 10- acre
building envelope to be 65% of the total lot value, and the one-acre home site value to be 1/10 of the 65%
attributed to the building envelope.
APPLICABLE LAW
1.

All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the

basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provide by law. (2) Beginning January
15 1995, the fair market value of residential property shall be reduced by 45%, representing a residential
exemption allowed under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2103.)
2.

''Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change hands between a

willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts For purposes of taxation, ufair market value'' shall be determined
using the current zoning laws applicable to the property in question, except in cases where there is a reasonable
probability of a change in the zoning laws affecting that property in the tax year in question and the change
would have an appreciable influence upon the value (Utah Code Sec 59-2-102(12).)
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3.

For general property tax purposes, land may be assessed on the basis of the value that the land

has for agricultural use if the land: (a) is not less than five contiguous acres in area. . . and (b) except as
provided in Subsection )5): (i) is actively devoted to agricultural use: and (ii) has been activelv devoted to
agricultural use for at least tvvo successive years immediately preceding the tax year for which the land is being
assessed under this part. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-503(1).)
4.

All structures which are located on land in agricultural use, the farmhouse and the land on

which the farmhouse is located, and land used in connection with the farmhouse, shall be valued, assessed, and
taxed using the same standards, methods, and procedures that apply to other taxable structures and other land
in the county. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507(2).)
5.

(2) In addition to the value determined in accordance with Subsection (1), the fair market

value assessment shall be included on the notices described in (a) Subsection 59-2-919(4); and (b) Section 592-1317. (3)The county board of equalization shall review the agricultural use value and fair market value
assessments each year as provided under Section 59-2-1001. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-505 (2)&(3).)
6.

Except as provided in this section, Section 59-2-506.5 or Section 59-2-511, if land is

withdrawn from this part, the land is subject to a roll back tax imposed in accordance with this section. (Utah
Code Sec. 59-2-506(1).)
7.

The county assessor shall determine the amount of the rollback tax by computing the

difference for the rollback period described in Subsection (3)(b) between: (i) the tax paid wile the land was
assessed under this part; and (ii) the tax that would have been paid had the property not been assessed under
this part. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-506(3).)
8.

Any person dissatisfied with the decision of the county board of equalization concerning the

assessment and equalization of any property, or the determination of any exemption in which the person has an
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interest, may appeal that decision to the commission by filing a notice of appeal specifying the grounds for the
appeal w ith the county auditor within 30 day s after the final action of the county board. (Utah Code Sec. 59-21006(1).)
9.

(2) In assessing the fair market value of a parcel of property that is subject to a minimum

parcel size of one acre or more, a county assessor shall include as part of the assessment: (a) that the parcel of
property may not be subdivided into parcels of property smaller than the minimum parcel size; and (b) any
effects Subsection (2)(a) may have on the fair market value of the parcel of property. (3) This section does not
prohibit a county assessor from including as part of an assessment of the fair market value of a parcel of
property any other factor affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property (Utah Code Sec. 59-2301.2(2) & (3).)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioner has raised two separate but related issues. The first is whether the value of a home

site contained within a larger and unsubdividable property may be retroactively established at the time of
assessment of a rollback tax. The second is the fair market value of the existing home site for purposes of
determining the current year's property tax assessment. To begin, a determination of the rollback tax presents
issues of both fact and law to the Commission. Pursuant to Utah Code Sec. 59-2-506 the amount of the
rollback tax is computed by taking the difference between the tax paid during the roll back period based on its
agricultural use under the FAA and the tax that would have been paid annually based on an a fair market value
assessment. For each year of the rollback period, the County on an annual basis had already determined the
fair market value for the subject property. Furthermore, the County was required to list the fair market value
on the Tax Valuation Notices as they were issued each year. If Petitioners were in disagreement with the
market value set by the County. Petitioners' recourse was to appeal the market value each year as prov ided in
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Sec 59-2-1001 Therefore, the total fair market value for each property at issue for the rollback years was
already established b> the County pursuant to the annual notices they issued that were not appealed and may
not now be challenged by either party based on the circumstances in this matter.
2.

Respondent's witnesses acknowledged, and it was supported by the exhibits and testimony of

Petitioners' witnesses, that when the County listed the fair market value on the annual notices mailed out for
the years subject to the rollback, it listed only a total value for the entire 160-acre parcel without any breakout
for home site land. Petitioners did not file annual appeals regarding the total market value indicated on the
notices for each of the rollback years. Petitioners were not given the opportunity to challenge the County's
allocation of the total market value to the home site acre, because they were never given notice of what that
amount was. Had Petitioners been notified of the allocation to the home site acre, and that it was an amount
different from a 1/160 allocation of the total value, Petitioners may have appealed the value on annual basis as
is provided in the statute at Utah Code Section 59-2-505 and 59-2-1001.
3.

Furthermore, the Commission notes that for rollback purposes, valuation is based on the

property, as it existed during the rollback period. Valuation is not based on the condition of the property that
results after a portion has been withdrawn from greenbelt. The Commission finds that if the County valued the
home site at a higher rate during the rollback years, the County should have indicated so annually on its
valuation notices as they were issued for each of those years, so that the home site value could have been
appealed annually pursuant to Utah Code Section 59-2-505 and 59-2-1001. Failure to do so alone is sufficient
for the Commission to fipd that rollback tax is limited to 1/160th 2 of the total value listed by the County each
year in its valuation notices issued to Petitioners.

Additionally, this legal basis is supported by the

Commission's factual conclusion that during the rollback period, there were no designated building envelopes

2 For Lot 46 which was 184 acres the rollback tax must be based on 1 184th of the total value
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or home sites and. therefore, each one of the 160 acres was as valuable as the rest. Prior to the issuance of the
building permit there would ha\e been no basis for the Count} to determine the one-acre home site upon which
the residence would be located.
4.

With respect to the second issue, the question of the current home site value, it is the

Commission's conclusion that the issue of determining the market value of the one-acre home site for the 2006
lien date presents both legal and factual issues. Petitioners' witness, Dr. Thomas, argued that a market value
could not be determined for the one acre as it could not be legally separated. Petitioners also argue that Utah
Code Sec. 59-2-301.2 regarding minimum parcel size supports their contention. Although the one-acre home
site may not legally be sold separately, Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507 requires that the County assess it at fair
market value and is the specific and controlling statute on the taxation of a home site used in connection with
greenbelt property. Subsection 507(2) provides that the farmhouse and land used in connection with the
farmhouse shall be valued, assessed, and taxed using the same standards, methods and procedures that apply to
other taxable land and structures in the County. However, the subsection does not provide specific guidance
on how to make that determination when the home site is part of an unsubdividable lot. Utah Code Sec. 59-2301.2 does prohibit the County from valuing the 160-acre subject parcels as if they were subdividable into
numerous single-family residential lots. The County has not valued this property as if higher density was
allowed. Furthermore, subsection 59-2-301.2 (3) expressly provides that the County Assessor may include as
part of the assessment other factors affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property. Finally, the fact
that Mr. Cook's valuations differ based on specific properly characteristics, in addition to size, implicit!}
demonstrates that the value of any given unit of land may vary from another within each lot.
5.

The Commission finds that each acre of the 160- acre parcel contributes to value. Prior to the

designation of the building envelope this was on an equal basis. However, once the buildable envelope was
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designated, as had occurred for all properties subject to this appeal bv the 2006 lien date, there are two distinct
and identifiable classes of property the 10 acre building en\elope and the remaining undevelopable area
covered b\ the conservation easement. These two areas do not contribute equallv to the value Respondent has
offered an appraisal that makes a distinction. Although the Commission disagrees with the limitation of the
analysis to the one acre, because the entire 10 acres is developable with the possibility of a second home,
garages, barns, outbuildings, yard features and so forth, which all contribute to the value of the building site,
the Commission finds that in the absence of testimony and evidence to the contrary, Mr. Hales' analysis
adequately supports that 65% of the value is attributable to the buildable envelope for these properties.
6.

As of the lien date, only one acre of the ten-acre buildable envelope had been withdrawn from

greenbelt for each of these properties. As additional improvements are made in the buildable envelope,
additional acreage may be withdrawn and rollback assessed.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that the County is to calculate the
rollback taxes for each of the properties for each rollback year based on the market value for the home site acre
being 1/160th or 1/184th' depend ing on the size of the lot, of the total value indicated for that vear on the tax
notices issued by the County. The County is to calculate the fair market value of the home site acre for the
2006 tax year for each parcel at issue on the basis of 65% of the total value of the lot as determined in the Cook
appraisal divided by 10. It is so ordered. The County Auditor is ordered to adjust the assessment records as
appropriate in compliance with this order.

DATED this

/

day of

C^Z/l^i^£^

2008.

Jan(g Phan
'
Administrative Law Judge
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BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision.
DATED this

/

da> of

£^*<2^£^!>

2008

EXCUSED
(Xyvu
Pam Hendnckson
Commission Chai

R Bruce Johnson
Commissioner

0Tv
D'Arcy Dixon Pi
Commissioner

Marc B Johns
Commissioner

Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-13 A
Request for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not
file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have
thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code
Sec 59-1-601 et seq and 63-46b-13 et seq.
JKP06-1504fofdoc
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EXHIBIT 2

RANDY M. GRIMSHAW (1259)
MAXWELL A. MILLER (2264)
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751)
Parsons Behle & Latimer
Attorneys for the Warren and Tricia Osbom
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)532-1234
Facsimile: (801)536-6111

•LED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial D.stnct

AUG 0 h 2003

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH COUNTY,
Petitioner,

ORDER GRANTING WARREN AND
TRICIA OSBORNS' MOTION TO
DISMISS

vs.
Case No. 080907392
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Judge John Paul Kennedy
Respondent.
Tax Commission Appeals Nos.: 06-1504,
06-1505, 06-1506, 06-1507, 06-1508, 061509,06-1510

This matter came before the Court for oral argument on: (1) Warren and Tricia Osborns'
Motion to Intervene ("Motion to Intervene") and (2) Warren and Tricia Osborns' Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Include Multiple Indispensable Parties ("Motion to Dismiss") on July 14,
2008, the Honorable John Paul Kennedy presiding. Appearing on behalf of Petitioner Wasatch
County was Wasatch County Attorney Thomas L. Lowe. Appearing on behalf on the Utah State
Tax Commission was Assistant Utah Attorney General Timothy A. Bodily. Appearing on behalf

of the Osborns were Maxwell A. Miller and Matthew D. Cook of Parsons Behle & Latimer.
Neither Wasatch County nor the Utah State Tax Commission objected to the Osborns'
participation in the proceeding.
At the end of the July 14, 2008 argument, the Court granted Wasatch County and the
Utah State Tax Commission the opportunity to file supplemental briefs addressing the argument
asserted by Warren and Tricia Osborn (the "Osborns") that once an aggrieved party has
exercised its statutory option to appeal a decision of the Tax Commission pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(a) by invoking the jurisdiction of the court of its choice, the court wherein a
subsequent attempt to invoke jurisdiction is made lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. The
parties, respectively, each filed supplemental briefs on the issue of the election of remedies. Oral
argument on the supplemental pleadings was held before the Court on July 28, 2008.
Upon consideration of the record, memoranda, arguments made, and being fully advised
in the premises, the Court enters the following Order granting the Osborns' Motion to Dismiss as
follows:
1.

The Osborns have standing to file a Motion to Dismiss.

2.

The Osborns and other property owners who were parties in the Tax Commission

proceeding, Warren and Tricia Osborn et al v. Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, Utah,
Appeal Nos. 06-1504, 06-1505, 06-1506, 06-1507, 06-1508, 06-1510, filed a Petition for Review
of the Tax Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision dated April
1, 2008 (the "Final Decision"), with the Utah Supreme Court on April 10, 2008, as Case No.
2008034 SC.

2

3.

On April 24, 2008, Wasatch County filed its Cross-Petition for Review of the

Utah State Tax Commission's Final Decision with the Utah Supreme Court in the same case,
Case No. 20080304 SC. Subsequently, on April 25, 2008, Wasatch County filed its Petition for
Review of the Decision in this Court, as Case No. 080907392
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-602 provides that "any aggrieved party appearing before

the commission or county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision," including Wasatch
County, has the "option" of filing a petition for review in the district court "or" in the Supreme
Court.

Wasatch County exercised its statutory option pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-

602(a)(1) by invoking the jurisdiction of the court of its choice, the Utah Supreme Court, by
filing its Cross-Petition for Review with the Utah Supreme Court on April 24, 2008.
Consequently, Wasatch County's subsequent attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court by
filing its Petition for Review on April 25, 2008 failed to invoke this Court's jurisdiction and was
in violation of Utah Code Ann. •§ 59-1-602(a)(1).

Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to

adjudicate Wasatch County's subsequently filed appeal with this Court, it retains jurisdiction
only to dismiss Wasatch County's Petition for Review.

For the reasons stated above, the

Osborns' Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted and Wasatch County's Petition for Review filed in
this Court on April 25, 2008 is hereby dismissed.
5.

The Court further cites to Salt Lake County v. Tax Commission, which provides:
Salt Lake County did not expressly waive (as our statute
contemplates that it should) its right of access to the Third Judicial
District Court for the relief it seeks here. We treat the omission as
a pleading deficiency of the kind to which the pleader's adversary
must make timely objection or the right to object is waived. (fh6)
In this connection, it is significant that the County's power to tax is
3

not dependent on the above cited statute; the statute merely
regulates the exercise of that power. The statute does not
undertake to remove the review of Commission decisions from the
jurisdiction of this Court, it merely states a condition which an
applicant for review is obligated to satisfy
Salt Lake County v Tax Commission, 596 P.2d 641, 644 (Utah 1979).
The Court finds, pursuant to the above cited case, that Osborns have timely objected to
Wasatch County's filing of duplicative appeals; therefore their right to object has not been
waived.

Timothy A. Bodily, Utaih Assistant Attorney General

Thomas L. Lowe. Wasatch County Attorney

4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 29, 2008, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER GRANTING WARREN AND TRICIA OSBORNS' MOTION TO INTERVENE
AND MOTION TO DISMISS to the following parties:
Timothy Bodily, Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Utah State Tax Commission
160 East 300 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Thomas Low, Wasatch County Attorney
Counsel for Wasatch County
805 West 100 South
Heber City, UT 84032
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59-1-601. District court jurisdiction.
(1) In addition to the jurisdiction granted in Section 63G-4-402, beginning July 1, 1994,
the district court shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all decisions issued by the
commission after that date resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) As used in this section, "trial de novo" means an original, independent proceeding,
and does not mean a trial de novo on the record.
(3) (a) In any appeal to the district court pursuant to this section taken after January 1,
1997, the commission shall certify a record of its proceedings to the district court.
(b) This Subsection (3) supercedes Section 63G-4-403 pertaining to judicial review of
formal adjudicative proceedings.
Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session
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59-1-602. Right to appeal -- Venue - County as party in interest.
(1) (a) Any aggrieved party appearing before the commission or county whose tax
revenues are affected by the decision may at that party's option petition for judicial review in
the district court pursuant to this section, or in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Section 59-1-610
(b) Judicial review of formal or informal adjudicative proceedings in the district is in the
district court located in the county of residence or principal place of business of the affected
taxpayer or, in the case of a taxpayer whose taxes are assessed on a statewide basis, to the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County.
(c) Notwithstanding Section 63G-4-402, a petition for review made to the district court
under this section shall conform to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(2) A county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision being reviewed shall be
allowed to be a party in interest in the proceeding before the court.
Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session
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EXHIBIT 4

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; intervention.
(a) Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial review by the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals is provided by statute of an order or decision of an administrative agency,
board, commission, committee, or officer (hereinafter the term "agency" shall include agency,
board, commission, committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of
the appellate court within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time prescribed, then
within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order. The petition shall specify the
parties seeking review and shall designate the respondent(s) and the order or decision, or part
thereof, to be reviewed. In each case, the agency shall be named respondent. The State of Utah
shall be deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated in the
petition. If two or more persons are entitled to petition for review of the same order and their
interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint petition for review and
may thereafter proceed as a single petitioner.
(b) Filing fees. At the time of filing any petition for review, the party obtaining the review shall
pay to the clerk of the appellate court the filing fee established by law. The clerk shall not accept
a petition for review unless the filing fee is paid.
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by the petitioner on the
named respondent(s), upon all other parties to the proceeding before the agency, and upon the
Attorney General of Utah, if the state is a party, in the manner prescribed by Rule 3(e). The
petitioner, at the time of filing the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the
appellate court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding who have
been served.
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under this rule shall serve
upon all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties who participated before the agency, and
file with the clerk of the appellate court a motion for leave to intervene. The motion shall contain
a concise statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which intervention
is sought. A motion for leave to intervene shall be filed within 40 days of the date on which the
petition for review is filed.

